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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRAY W. Z E M P and BILL 
Z E M P , 
Plaintiffs and Respondents , 
v . 
VAN FRANK & ASSOCIATES, INC* , 
and ROGER M. VANFRANK, 
Defendants and Appellants , 
No. 14089 
APPELLANTS 1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to invalidate a contract with defendant a rch i t ec t s 
to draw plans for a duplex, and for damages , including punitive damages; 
defendants countercla imed to r ecove r for the i r a r ch i t ec tu ra l s e r v i c e s , to 
foreclose a mechanic f s lien therefor , and to obtain damages for l ibel . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was t r i ed to the court , si t t ing without a ju ry . The court 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, for the mos t pa r t , and defendants 
appeal . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Defendants seek r e v e r s a l of the judgment, an equitable review of the 
r e c o r d by this cour t , and judgment in defendants ' favor as a ma t t e r of equity 
and law. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The claim of plaintiffs to nullify and cancel the contract, and the 
counterclaim of defendants to foreclose their mechanic1 s lien invoked the 
equitable jurisdiction of the court. It is submitted that, accordingly, this 
court should determine the facts as well as the law of this case. The entire 
record is presented for this purpose. 
Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as the Zemps, contacted defend-
ant corporation and Roger van Frank, who are a professional corporation 
and licensed architect, respectively, hereinafter referred to as van Frank. 
They requested van Frank to prepare for them architectural drawings for a 
duplex. The new building was to be situated upon a lot owned by Fray Zemp 
and her father, upon which lot Zemps already had two other duplexes. On 
June 6, 1973 the parties signed a Contract for Permi t Drawings (Exh 1-P). 
There is considerable greatly conflicting testimony about whether 
the drawings prepared by van Frank were for the kind of building Zemps 
said they wanted, and about other mat ters . To put it kindly, somebody was 
surely careless about the truth. 
Zemps stated in their complaint, in their answers to interrogatories 
and sometimes on the witness stand (R 92,102, 12 9, 131, 137) that there was 
no part of the plans and specifications that were what they had ordered or 
requested from van Frank. Bill Zemp testified that he did not read the an-
swers to interrogatories before he signed them and that he would have 
signed them no matter what they said or didn't say (R 96). Zemps some-
times testified that they were not given any opportunity to request any 
changes and that van F r a n k would not l i s ten to any r eques t s by them for 
changes (R 110,116, 126-7). Zemps somet imes testified that they did r e -
quest changes (R 91, 97-100, 105, 115, 130, 137-40, 331), that v a n F r a n k did 
d i scuss changes with them (R 97,105, 123,130, 325-6, 332-3) and that changes 
were made (R 130, 332) but that they did not like the plans (R 108-9) or the 
changes (R 324-334) or that changes were all r ight (R 130). In r esponse to 
a question by the court , Bill Zemp said he did not complain to v a n F r a n k 
about the plans (R 101), but after h i s lawyer "put words in his face" , with 
leading ques t ions , he said he did complain about them (R 101-2). 
Roger v a n F r a n k and his a r ch i t ec tu ra l a s s i s t an t , Dennis Cecchini , 
testified that they t r i ed to p r epa re drawings for the kind of building Z e m p s 
said they wanted (R 7-11 , 1 6 , 2 0 , 2 6 , 5 4 - 5 , 6 4 , 2 8 9 - 9 9 , 3 1 2 ) ; that they s t a r t ed 
by talking with Zemps and by following a rough sketch in blue ink made by 
Bill Zemp (Exh 2 - P , R 10-11, 65-6); that thereaf te r , pursuant to d i s c u s -
sions with Z e m p s , they made changes in the location and style of s t a i rways , 
windows, the roof, f i r ep laces , the building elevation and other things (R 6 5 -
71 ,77 ,169 ,173-7 ,293-303 ; Exhs 38-D, 43-D); that the or iginal drawings 
were e r a sed and redrawn and r e - e r a s e d and r ed rawn a s Zemps wanted 
changes, and that some of the e r a s e d l ines show as "ghos t s " on the drawings 
(Exhs 37-D thru 42-D, R 169,288-95); that differences between the s c h e -
mat ic drawings (Exhs 2 -P ,33 -D) the p re l imina ry drawings (Exhs 19-D thru 
24-D) and the final drawings (Exhs 37-D thru 42-D) a l so show changes made 
for the Z e m p s (R 60-1) . 
Roger v a n F r a n k and his employees test if ied that it was not until long 
after the final drawings had been completed and delivered to Zemps that 
Zempfc claimed they were not satisfactory as completed; that it was not 
until van Frank was requesting payment and had filed a mechanic's lien the re -
for (R 299); that van Frank charged $60 for changes that were ordered by 
Zemps (R 17,23-7,47), differing from the original instructions; that van 
Frank, without additional charge therefor (R 56-7) prepared specifications 
(Exh 18-D) containing details necessary for Zemps to obtain a building pe r -
mit, which details otherwise might have appeared on the drawings them-
selves (R 56, 80); that the specifications were completed for delivery on 
July 20, 1973 (R 9, 23, 57-9) when Fray Zemp called at vanFrank fs office to 
discuss the matter and to request van Frank to put pressure for payment on 
her husband, directly, referring to personal problems between themselves 
(R 83-4). 
On August 23, 1973 vanFrank recorded a notice of mechanic1 s lien 
(Exh 5-P). This notice claimed an amount much more than the invoice to 
Zemps because when vanFrank prepared the notice they believed they should 
claim a sum that would be the maximum of attorney's fees, delinquency 
charges, interest and costs that they might incur in a contested foreclosure 
proceeding or they would be barred from collecting such sums. However, 
at no time did defendant demand this higher amount from Zemps. On 
October 5, 1973 vanFrank recorded its amended notice of lien (Exh 14-P), 
claiming the principal sum of $616. 33, the original invoice amount. 
On October 4, 1973 vanFrank 's lawyer received from Zemps1 lawyer 
a letter (Exh 9-P and 34-D) which contained a cashier 's check (Exh 8-P) in 
A 
the amount of $626. 57. The letter stated that the money was tendered to 
release the lien but also stated that it was "in payment for the so-called 
building drawings, which are wholely unsatisfactory, " and stated that Zemps 
subsequently would make demand "to comply with furnishing the plans that 
were ordered and not the misfit plans". The letter also stated: 
"The contract for permit drawings was signed by my 
client before any plans were made or drawn and it 
appears that the owner, under such circumstances, 
is stuck for the drawings regardless of how piss-poor 
they may appear or end up being. Besides having a 
blanket check for the initial amount of 15£ per square 
foot, the architect under the supposed agreement is 
given a further blank check to charge for time taken 
by the owner to correct and direct the architect to 
accomplish that which he should do in the first place, 
and it appears under such circumstances, that the 
more stupid the architect is , the more he is entitled 
to charge therefor because he can charge time on cor-
recting his own stupid mistakes. " 
On October 5, 1973 van Frank 's lawyer, on instructions from van 
Frank, returned the check with his letter stating grounds for rejection of a 
conditional tender, not only because of unacceptable conditions but also 
because the tender did not include costs for cancellation of the lien and at-
torney's fees, as provided in the contract. Reference was made therein to 
a letter dated September 27, 1973 from van Frank 's lawyer to Zemps' law-
yer itemizing the amount claimed. 
No payment or further tender of payment was made by Zemps and on 
November 21, 1973 they filed this action against van Frank in four counts, 
seeking to have the contract with van Frank declared null and void, as against 
public policy and for lack of consideration, and seeking punitive damages, 
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attorney fs fees, and a statutory penalty of $20 per day, pursuant to U. C. A. 
38-1-24, for van Frank fs refusal and failure to release the lien(s). Van 
Frank responded with an answer and counterclaim in three counts, charging 
Zemps with libel, claiming payment for the architectural services and a t -
torney's fees, per contract, and praying foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. 
The case came on for trial in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, sitting without a jury. At the trial the 
following witnesses were called to testify for plaintiffs, Zemps: Roger van 
Frank, Bill Zemp and Fray Zemp, about matters involved in Zemps1 claims 
against van Frank, generally; Gordon Connley, a Salt Lake County building 
inspector, Ronald Ivie, a Salt Lake County plans and specifications analyst 
in the Building and Zoning Department, and Alvin Mason, a Salt Lake City 
engineer, who prepared substitute plans for the duplex (R 74). These wit-
nesses testified that some changes would be required in the van Frank draw-
ings before they would comply with the County Building Code. 
VanFrank called the following witnesses in connection with his de-
fenses and counterclaims: Roger van Frank, Bill Zemp, Fray Zemp, Dennis 
Cecchini, who is a graduate in architecture employed by van Frank, Brigitta 
Gornik, who is an architectural draftsman for van Frank, Carol Merri t t , 
who was vanFrank fs secretary during the period when the drawings and 
specifications were prepared, Mari Davis, who is the replacement secretary 
for Mrs . Merrit t , and Cheryl Waldman, the secretary for van Frank ' s law-
yer . In their work as secretar ies , Mrs . Davis and Mrs . Waldman read the 
libelous letter referred to above. 
Following the presentation of evidence and arguments of counsel, 
the court announced its decision into the record (R 339-347). Many months 
afterward, and before presenting proposed findings and decree to the court, 
Zemps through counsel renewed a motion to have Roger van Frank joined 
as an individual party defendant and to be held personally liable to plaintiffs. 
Upon a hearing thereof this motion was granted. Subsequently, said at tor-
ney presented to the court its findings of fact and conclusions of law and its 
decree, for entry. Thereupon, van Frank through counsel moved to amend 
them, which order was denied on April 3, 1975. Thereafter, notice of van 
Frank rs appeal was timely served. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The findings and conclusions and the decree do not comply with 
the decision announced by the court. 
2. The decision of the court and the findings and conclusions and 
the decree are not supported by the evidence. The evidence 
clearly shows that: 
a. Defendants performed the contract and are entitled to be paid; 
b. The mechanic fs lien was entitled to foreclosure; 
c. Defendants were libeled by plaintiffs. 
3. The statutory penalty imposed upon defendants is against the law. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The findings and conclusions and the decree do not comply with 
the decision announced by the court. 
7 ' 
If this court should feel that in equity the findings and conclusions 
and the decree are supported by the evidence (but see Point 2, below) it is 
clear that those documents, prepared by plaintiffs' attorney, varied in im-
portant particulars from the decision of the court, announced at the close 
of t r ial . Although the formal findings and decree do constitute the action of 
the court unless changed, two things are very proper to keep in mind in this 
connection. Fi rs t , the decision announced by the court is the judge's own, 
direct findings and conclusions — not the restatement thereof prepared later 
by an advocate. The advocate, even unconsciously, can hardly help but 
shade many things in favor of his client. We see this all the time, where 
the facts found have become more black or white in the formal findings. 
Secondly, the appellate court although indulging a reluctance to set aside 
findings, should properly know, particularly in an equity case, to what 
extent the findings were at first those of the judge, when the evidence was 
fresh in his mind, rather than the draftsmanship of the advocate, placed 
before the busy judge for his signature at a later time. 
This is important in connection with the finding of the court that 
there was absolutely no evidence of wilful or malicious conduct on the part 
of defendants which would entitle plaintiffs to punitive or exemplary dam-
ages (see Point 3, below). Further , the court found that there was only one 
lien, which was amended to set forth the correct amount, and that it was 
properly filed (R 344). Further , the Zemps1 tender of payment was both 
for the purpose of releasing the lien and also ffin payment for the so-called 
building drawings11 (Exh 9-P), Further , the findings do not show, contrary 
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to the stipulation of the parties, that the per-square-foot amount of defend-
ants ' invoice should have been the sum of $474. 27 instead of the sum of 
$551.10. There are additional, perhaps less material, variations between 
the findings prepared by Zemps' lawyer and the decision announced by the 
court. 
2. The decision of the court and the findings and conclusions and the 
decree are not supported by the evidence. 
The first cause of action of Zemps r complaint prays that the archi-
tectural contract (Exh 1-P) be declared null and void and that the court 
grant them just and equitable relief. A suit to obtain the recission of a 
contract or the cancellation of an instrument is peculiarly one of equitable 
cognizance, even though as an incident to cancellation or recission the r e -
covery of money also is sought. This should be borne in mind in dealing 
with questions of judicial recission or cancellation notwithstanding the fact 
that there is now in most states but one form of remedy for both legal and 
equitable causes of action. In applying the relief allowable, the courts still 
adhere to the distinctions commonly accepted between actions of law and 
suits in equity. 13 Am Jur 2d, Cancellation of Instruments, Sec 2. 
Van Frank 's counterclaim to foreclose the mechanic's lien also seeks 
a remedy that is uniquely equitable. Where the distinction between actions 
of law and suits in equity is maintained, proceedings to enforce mechanic's 
liens are regarded as suits in equity and are governed by the rules of chan-
cery practice. 53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanics Liens, Sec 349. This court has 
held that an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is an equity case. Langton 
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Lime & Cement Co. v. Peery, 48 Utah 112, 159 P . 49. 
In equity cases, of course, the appeal to this court may be on ques-
tions of both law and fact. Utah Const. , Art . VIII, Sec, 9. Petty v. Clark, 
113 U 205, 192 P2d 589. We recognize that in applying this traditionally 
equitable review the appellate court will not disturb the tr ial judgefs find-
ings unless it appears that the evidence clearly preponderates against such 
findings. But as observed in Wiese v. Wiese, 24 U2d 236, 469 P2d 504: 
This is an equitable matter, and upon appeal the 
binding effect of the findings made by the tr ial court 
differs from that in a law matter. We may here 
review questions of both law and fact; and after 
making due allowance for the advantaged position of 
the trial judge to observe the demeanor of witnesses 
upon the stand, we may be persuaded that a finding 
is against the preponderance of the evidence to such 
an extent that we would be justified in disapproving 
it or even in making a finding of our own. (Cases 
cited.) 
a. Defendants performed the contract and are entitled to be paid. 
The record clearly shows substantial discrepancies in the tes t i -
mony of the Zemps as contrasted with the testimony of Roger van Frank and 
his witnesses,as detailed above. The t r ia l court so observed in rendering 
his decision and he appears to have rejected the conflicting testimony of 
both sides and to have emphasized unduly "the only uncontroverted evidence 
in the record" that Zemps wanted a plan for a duplex to be as large as pos-
sible and to "look like" the other duplexes (R 127, 136, 345 but see R 115). 
Or to "comply with" them (R 4, 115, 136)? Actually, Fray Zemp controverted 
even this because look-like is not the same as comply-with. 
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If there were no clearly obvious reasons to believe one witness oyer 
another, it would seem that the contradictory testimony might be at a stand-
off- However, there is in the record the clear impeachment <?£ Bill and
 T 
Fray Zemp. Their testimony not only contradicts that of Roger van Frank .^ 
and his employees, they each contradicted themselves in important matters . 
In determining the truth, an unbelievable witness does not tip the scales
 :J3 
against & believable witness: Hdw can we believe, as they stated, that there 
was not one part of the plans and specifications that were what they had f;£SV 
ordered or requested from vanFrank, that they were not given any oppor-p 
tunity to request any changes and that vanFrank would not listen to any ,:, 0^ 
requests by them for changes? Particularly, how can we believe this when 
they also testified that they did request changes, that vanFrank did discuss 
changes with them, and that changes were made. Also, it is significant that 
Bill Zemp's sworn answers to the vanFrank interrogatories were not even 
read by him before he signed them, that he admitted in court that he did not 
know one question therein contained, and that he said he would have signed^ 
them when they were put before him no matter what they said or cii<foft §a^-
,iif^ The evidence is so contradictory it is apparent that more than mere 
mistake or faulty memory of witnesses is involved. The extreme position • 
taken by Zemps, claiming total dissatisfaction with these carefully prepared 
drawings, and no opportunity to state their wishes, bespeaks wilfully false
 c 
testimony. Note the repeated evasions by Fray Zemp in her testimony oof 
starting at R 116. We tell jurors that if they believe any witness has wil- j 




testimony of such witness, unless otherwise corroborated. Gittens v. 
Lundberg, 3 U2d 392, 284 P2d 1115. Contradictory evidence frequently 
must be considered in this way, not by simply disregarding all contradic-
• tions and only looking at whatever may be left. 
On van Frank fs side of it, if Zemps f claim is true, why are there 
any ghosts (incompletely erased lines) on the drawings at all? Why did 
Roger van Frank and Dennis Ce echini redraw anything? Did it make it 
easier for them to show a profit on this project by drawing anything twice? 
The ghosts are real evidence of a very persuasive nature. They are not 
someone's recollection long afterward, and hence more likely to be inaccu-
ra te . They show clearly that changes were made in the location and style of 
many things. It becomes clear in the evidence that the new duplex could not 
look just like the existing duplexes because to do so it could not contain the 
changes that the Zemps asked van Frank to make. For instance, how could 
a duplex with bay windows look like duplexes without them? It is clear that 
the Zemps sometimes disagreed between themselves and sometimes changed 
their minds (see R 99-100). This is not necessarily wrong but to deny it is 
wrong. Under these circumstances does a court of equity say to van Frank, 
as the t r ia l court in effect said, MYou get nothing for your efforts"? If we 
are to fault van Frank in this connection, it should be for trying to do too 
much to prepare a functional and attractive building, rather than for doing 
too little. It appears his office does not specialize in architectural boiler 
plate. 
12 
Much of Zemps1 affirmative case was evidence that the van Frank 
drawings and specifications did not comply with the building code and could 
not be approved for construction. In particular, a great deal of emphasis 
was placed on the eight-inch or nine-inch foundation wall matter. However, 
after vanFrank asked Zemps f witnesses to show such a requirement in the 
code (Exh 29-P) and after they said that they would locate it and bring it to 
court (R 148-9) they never did show such a building code requirement and 
they never did bring such a supplement or additional regulation to court. 
Why not? --because there was none. To the contrary, there was evidence 
that a one-inch overhang of the facing brick, and remember this is only brick 
veneer, may be and sometimes is approved. In any event, testimony was 
given by the County building inspector, Mr. Connley, that upon submission 
of drawings and a disapproval of an eight-inch foundation it would be a simple 
matter, without even redrawing anything, to specify a nine-inch thickness 
instead of eight-inch (R 144-5). Mr. Connley testified that when drawings 
are submitted and some things are found that necessitate changes it is com-
mon practice simply to write the changes upon the drawings in red ink, 
before a building permit issues (R 145). VanFrank testified that this would 
have been done readily, without any charge to the Zemps, if it appeared 
that it was an a rch i t ec t s e r ro r . 
Another item in this connection is Zemps ' assertion that the roof was 
not trussed properly in the drawings or specifications (R 153). Yet they also 
took the position that the t russ diagram (R 300, Exh 43-D) for proper trussing, 
that vanFrank attached to and made a part of the specifications (which was 
13 
the final portion of the project not completed until July 20th) were a non-
essential part of vanFrank fs work (R 313 but see 152-5, 300). Again, 
variances in testimony between opposing witnesses is one thing, material 
variances in the testimony of witnesses on the same side is something else. 
b. The mechanic's lien was entitled to foreclosure.
 : 
Although he ruled against van Frank, generally, the t r ia l court 
nevertheless found that the mechanic's lien was sufficient, as amended, and 
was properly filed. His conclusion was that if van Frank was entitled to 
anything under the contract he would be entitled to foreclose unless there 
was a proper tender. The court found that there was a proper tender because 
Zemps offered more than van Frank was entitled to, if he was entitled to any-
thing. 
Was vanFrank 's rejection of Zemp's tender proper? The amount 
tendered did not include fees for cancellation of the lien or attorney's fees, 
as provided in the contract. See Einerson v. Central Lumber & Hardware 
Co. , 14 U2d 2 78, 382 P2d 655. It might be noted that the amount of a t tor-
ney's fees claimed was the amount provided by the Third District Court 's 
schedule, which is stated to be acceptable without proof in default cases to 
charge a debtor with attorney's fees (where so obligated) and the amount that 
was claimed against Zemps is approximately one-third of the principal 
claimed. It may be felt that although attorney's fees are provided in the 
contract there is no need to pay them to discharge a mechanic's lien. Never-
theless, where the tender is not only to release the lien but also to pay the 
debt, here Min payment for the so-called building drawings" (Exh 34-D), 
1A 
that would leave the creditor in the position of having to sue thereafter only 
to recover his contractual attorney's fees and almost certainly to be con-
fronted with the defense that he had barred himself from any further claim 
by accepting the amount tendered. This would operate to nullify such con-
tractual provisions. A mechanics lien holder may recover attorney's fees 
from his obligor where the contract between them provides therefor. 57 
C . J .S . Mechanics Liens, Sec 353. 
If it be felt that van Frank was claiming more than he was entitled to, 
anyway, and hence had no right to reject the tender, we would have this 
result: that a lien claimant, though acting in good faith, will be at his peril 
if it subsequently develops that through any e r ror , such as in computation, 
the amount claimed was incorrect. It has been held that such an e r ror does 
not invalidate a lien, for the correct amount. 53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanics 
Liens, Sec. 234. 
It should be noted in the instant case that although on first appearance 
it would appear to be a simple matter to determine the number of square 
feet covered by the drawings, in practical effect there are factors, such as 
roof overhangs, "exterior construction", bay-windows, etc. which are not 
always treated in the same way for such purposes. More than an hour of 
time in court and during the lunch recess , and eleven pages of the record, 
were taken up with this matter (R 28-38). Van Frank 's invoice claimed 
payment for 3674 square feet, and in the answers to vanFrankTs interrog-
atories Zemps claimed that 3020 square feet was the proper area. Its 
ultimate resolution, by stipulation, produced an area of 3161 square feet, 
1R 
neither party having been very accurate at first (R 38). 
c. Defendants were libeled by plaintiffs. 
The letter dated October 2, 1973 (Exh 34-D) from Zemps1 lawyer 
to van Franks ' lawyer, which accompanied the tendered check, so inflamed 
Roger van Frank and so upset his secretary and other personnel in his 
office that an early, practical adjustment of this matter became impossible. 
The trial court raised the question whether it relates personally to 
Mr. van Frank. How can it be interpreted any other way? It refers to this 
contract and in the same sentence, quoted above, says that the architect, 
obviously this architect, is given a blank check; that under such circum-
stances the more stupid the architect is the more he can charge to correct 
his own stupid mistakes. This not only imputes stupidity, it imputes in-
tentional mischarging. An architect who prepares piss-poor drawings, 
drawings that are only so-called architectural plans and are misfit, who 
makes stupid mistakes, and who demands a blank check for the purpose of 
mischarging his clients, does have his reputation impeached and is exposed 
to contempt and ridicule. Beyond that, the negative effect upon his profes-
sional business is obvious. 
Was the letter published? The tr ial court appears to have been in 
some dilemma about this, taking the position that either there was no harm 
in the letter or, if there was, that it should have been personally secreted 
from the secre tar ies . How this should have been done is not clear. This 
was theletter of transmittal of the tender, containing the conditions of tender 
and an important part of the records of each office in this connection. In 
1 a 
any event, it has been held that where a person to whom a claim is presented 
by attorneys in behalf of their client sends to the attorneys a libelous com-
munication concerning the client there is a sufficient publication. Massee 
v. Williams, (CCA6th, Tenn) 207 F 222; Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Brooks, 
69 Miss 168, 13 So 847; Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co, 167 NC 9, 82 SE 
561. These charges were also published to the secretary who typed the let-
ter . The court took the position that it was a confidential matter, but under 
these authorities this would not excuse libelous publication. 
Was the letter privileged? In Savage v. Stober, 86 NJL 478, 92 A 
284, affd 87 NJL 711, 94 A 1103, defendant attorney wrote a letter to the 
attorney representing an employer against whom clients of defendant were 
making a claim. The letter said that the employer was one of the most cold-
blooded of men, had provoked assault and battery, and treated his employees 
like dogs. The court held that this language was manifestly volunteered, 
was not in response to any inquiry, whether confidential or otherwise, clearly 
exceeded the demands of the occasion, and was not covered by a privilege. 
So, that language in the letter from one lawyer to another was deemed pub-
lished and not privileged. In Tuson v. Evans, 113 Eng. Reprint 991, defend-
ant, in a libel action, had claimed rent from plaintiff, which plaintiff denied 
owing. Defendant then wrote plaintiff's agent, stating facts in support of his 
claim but adding "this attempt to defraud me of the produce of the land is as 
mean as it is dishonest". It was held that although a responsive letter from 
defendant was proper, to deny the merit of plaintiff's denial, that to char-
acterize that assertion as an attempt to defraud, and as mean and dishonest, 
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was wholly unnecessary and not justified by the occasion. Instructions to 
the jury that this publication was necessarily a libel under the law were held 
to be proper. 
In the instant case, the court made reference to the publication being 
privileged because the matter is involved in this lawsuit. But there was no 
lawsuit at that time. In all actions for libel the defamatory material becomes 
involved in a lawsuit, and we acknowledge that defamatory statements made 
during litigation are privileged. 
In this connection, it should be noted that the statements in the let ter 
are imputed to the Zemps and bind them under the rule that a client is liable 
to a third person injured by an act of the attorney done in the execution of 
matters within the scope of his authority. 7 C. J .S . Attorney and Client, 
Sec 68; Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal 2d 537, 134 P2d 217. 
Was there damage as a result? Van Frank did not have evidence of 
special damage. He did not have witnesses who have told him there are 
rumors that he is neither competent nor honest enough to be an architect. 
We know in human affairs that many such imputations never really surface, 
but often are so created, and persist . For such reasons the law, very prop-
erly, recognizes a right to general damages, without specific proof, for 
some injuries to reputation. And such damages need not be only a dollar. < 
This court said as much very recently in Prince v. Peterson, No. 13765, 
filed July 22, 1975. The court cited 53 C. J .S . 362, which says: 
If the defamatory charge is actionable per se, the 
plaintiff is entitled at least to nominal damages, and 
it is generally held that he is not required to show 
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7/;: -.:S actual damage in o rder to entit le him to substant ia l ^ , j I ; . r , 
damages . 
And see a lso Corbin v. Madison, 12 Wash App 318, 529 P2d 1145; 50 Am 
Jur 2d 869. The opinion in P r i n c e v. P e t e r s o n made re fe rence to the gen-
e r a l rule that wri t ten or pr inted words a r e actionable pe r se if they a r e used 
in a s i tuat ion d>r context where they would reasonably be understood to impute 
dishonesty, or other defamatory connotation, or where they hold the one to 
whom they re fe r up to ha t red , contempt or r id icu le . 50 4 ^ «Jur 2d 579. 
The defamatory language c lear ly at tacked Roger van F rank , p e r s o n -
b s l l s i fans fastb ^f:^ UILI ;. • ^_.j • , - . . - • 
ally, but if it be considered to r e l a t e to his profess ional corporat ion, the 
s ame damage is sustained. A corporat ion can be the subject of defamation 
just a s can an individual and this pa r t i cu la r ly would be t rue of a profess ional 
pe r son f s incorporat ion, where the quality and integri ty of the p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
s e r v i c e s a r e vi tal to his pe r sona l and corpora te good standing in his p r o f e s -
sion and in the community. 53 C. J . S . L ibe l and Slander , Sec 146. 
3. The s ta tutory penalty imposed upon defendants is against the law. 
It i s submitted that the s ame r e a s o n s that preclude the award to the 
Z e m p s of punitive damages at common law a lso prec lude the award to them 
of the s ta tutory penalty under U. C. A. 38-1-24, entit led Cancellat ion of 
r e c o r d - - Penalty* As a genera l ru l e , penal t ies a r e applied re luctant ly by 
the cour t s , whether the provis ions therefor be by contrac t , s ta tu te , or 
'.-Hlo 
decis ional law. In Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 29 U2d 170, 506 P2d 809, th i s 
court said: 
t * '- .<**. >J;UY7 j j l o l b • '
 lttlX , , -
The obligation placed upon the City by th i s judgment 
i * -ibr; rr at ccould not be other than a penalty c rea ted by s ta tu te . . , n , 0 . ._, 
ma 
Such penalties are not favored in the law and are 
applied only when the fact situation clearly justifies 
invoking the mandate of the statute. 
The view of the courts is that the penalty is designed to punish wilful 
and malicious misconduct, rather than things that although careless or e r r o -
neous, do not proceed from such bad intent. The tr ial court fs findings in 
this connection in this case are well supported by the evidence: There might 
have been or was some carelessness on the part of Roger van Frank or his 
employees (that resulted in an excess charge of $76. 80, R 38) but there was 
absolutely no evidence of wilful or malicious conduct on the part of van Frank 
which would entitle Zemps to punitive damages (R 339, 343). The court con-
cluded, however, that the statutory penalty would apply just the same.. Ap-
pellants believe this was erroneous. 
Research has not disclosed authority directly in point as to the effect 
of good faith on a mechanics lien statutory penalty such as ours, but there 
are cases which show how strictly such a provision is construed against the 
person claiming such a penalty. For instance, a plaintiff has been held by 
this court not entitled to this penalty for defendant's failure to release the 
lien where plaintiff merely had failed to pay or tender the cost incurred and 
the fees for cancellation. Einerson v. Central Lumber & Hardware Co. , 
14 U 2d 278, 382 P2d 655. See Sheets v. P rosse r , 112 NW 72 (N.D.). Such 
costs and fees are ordinarily very nominal. In fact, the recording fee for 
cancellation in Utah is only several dollars (R 309-10). 
This court has applied the general rule against penalties as to a 
mortgage lien on realty, in Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, 115 U 395, 
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205 P 2d 251. That case interpreted the application of U. C. A. 57-3-8, 
which provides a double damages penalty for a failure to discharge or r e -
lease a mortgage after satisfaction. There it was established that defendant 
bank had acted in good faith, and honestly though erroneously believed that it 
had valid and subsisting mortgages against plaintiff which had not been sa t i s -
fied, and refused to release them. The opinion, referring to that statute, 
states at 205 P2d 254: 
Here, respondent also claims "good faith" and urges 
that as a defense. Respondent's argument is well 
taken. The above statute is penal in nature and should 
be strictly construed. It is not meant to penalize one 
who honestly, though mistakenly, refuses to release or 
discharge a mortgage of record because he believes 
there has been no full satisfaction. 
The court thus concluded that good faith refusal to release themortgages was 
a defense and therefore defendant was not liable for damages under the pen-
alty statute. The opinion cited Mathieu v. Boston, 51 SD 619, 216 NW 361, 
56 ALR 332 and notes on pages 345 and 346 of the annotation on the question 
of "good faith" as a defense under similar statutes. Mathieu held that r e -
fusal by a mortgagee to execute a discharge, when acting in good faith and 
under the honest, but erroneous, belief that the debt has not been paid, does 
not bring him within the operation of such a statute and does not make him 
liable for a statutory penalty. There the court quoted Jones on Mortgages, 
7th ed vol 2, Sec. 991: 
. . . the mortgagee is not bound upon tender of pay-
ment to determine doubtful questions at his peril , and 
he is not generally held liable to the statutory penalty 
if his refusal is made in good faith and in the honest 
belief that he is not bound to accept the tender. 
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The Mathieu case also cites Schumacher v. Fal ter , 113 Wis 563, 89 NW 
485, in construing Sec 2256 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin: 
Although that section does not provide, in t e rms , that 
the failure to discharge must be a wilful or malicious 
one, it is very evident that it was not enacted to punish 
honest mistakes. A statute in almost the identical 
language of our section has been construed many times 
by the Supreme Court of Michigan; and the substance 
of the decisions in that state is that where there is no 
intentional wrong in the refusal to discharge, but,rather 
a reliance in good faith upon some supposed legal right, 
the penalty will not be imposed, even though the sup-
posed right may be found not to exist. (Emphasis added). 
The annotation at 56 ALR 335 of the Mathieu case, cited and relied 
upon by this court in Shibata, also refers , at pages 343-44, to decisions in 
which the statutory penalty was denied:for a failure to pay the recording fee, 
or to pay a release fee, or to pay taxes, or to pay insurance premiums, or 
to pay interest, or to pay attorney fs fees. An Alabama case, Mayhall v. 
Woodhall, 192 Ala 134, 68 So 322 ruled that if interest on the mortgage debt 
in the amount of fourteen cents is unpaid, the mortgagee will not be required 
to pay the statutory penalty. We make these references by analogy, as 
additional showing of the reluctance of the courts to impose a harsh statutory 
penalty in a case where punitive or exemplary damages generally would not 
lie. 
At the tr ial , Roger van Frank acknowledged the e r ro r made in his 
office in regard to the amount of square footage and endeavored in coopera-
tion with counsel to locate the source of the e r ro r and to determine the cor -
rect amount. The court commended him for this and said following the evi-
dence that there was absolutely no evidence of wilful or malicious conduct on 
9 9 
vanFrank fs part which would entitle Zemps to punitive or exemplary damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants feel the record clearly shows that the t r ia l court 's find-
ings and conclusions and its decree are not supported by believable evidence 
in many important particulars. 
They respectfully submit that this court, in the exercise of its equi-
table jurisdiction, should find, conclude and decree that appellants did per -
form the contract and are entitled to be paid for their services; that it should 
decree in their favor the amount of $539. 53 therefor, together with interest 
at the legal rate and attorney's fees in a reasonable amount (such as $250, as 
determined by the tr ial court for respondents) and their costs. An equitable 
lien therefor on Zemps' interest in the premises should be declared, in lieu 
of the mechanic's lien released per the decree of the tr ial court. 
Appellants further request this court to award them an appropriate 
amount of general damages for the libel, and they waive their claim against 
respondents for any punitive damages. 
In any event, appellants urge that there is no lawful basis to sustain 
the decree that they pay respondents a statutory penalty of $20 per day for 
non-cancellation of the mechanic's lien. 
Respectfully submitted, this 19th day of September, 1975. 
VICTOR A, SPENCER 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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